Michigan Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 3

1952

EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS
Reece A. Gardner
Member, Missouri Bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Reece A. Gardner, EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS, 50 MICH. L. REV. 409 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1952]

EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS

409

EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS*
Reece A. Gardnert

taxation to an employee of the difference between the fair
market value of a share of stock transferred to him by a corporate employer, pursuant to the employee's exercise of an option to
acquire it at a price below the value of the share, has for years been
a matter of dispute between taxpayers and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This dispute has involved not merely, as in the case of
many of the hardy tax perennials such as reasonableness of compensation, a question as to the application of facts to a well-defined principle
of law, but rather a question of the correct legal concept.1 The deductibility of such difference by the corporate employer has been viewed
as a corollary of the employee's tax liability and hence in that field
the same controversy has prevailed.2 That conflict has been in part,
although only in part, resolved by the enactment of section 130A of
the Internal Revenue Cod~,3 which under certain circumstances exempts income which might be derived by the employee from the
exercise of a stock option, but at the sacrifice by the corporation of any
deduction it might otherwise have. In cases where the corporation's
objective is to induce its employees to make an investment of their own
funds in the stock of the corporation, in the belief that a proprietary
interest in the enterprise will stimulate their efficiency and productivity, it will undoubtedly find it advantageous to devise a plan meeting
all of the requirements of the new statutory provisions. On the other

T
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"' Paper delivered at the Institute on the Taxation of Business Enterprise, sponsored by
the University of Michigan Law School, June 25-28, 1951.-Ed.
t Member, Missouri Bar.-Ed.
1 Rose v. Trust Company of Georgia, (D.C. Ga. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 997, affd. (5th Cir.
1928) 28 F. (2d) 767; Durkee v. Welch, (D.C. Cal. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 339; Bothwell v.
Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 35; Merhengood Corp. v. Helvering, (D.C.
Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 972, cert. den. 302 U.S. 714, 58 S.Ct. 33 (1937); Rossheim v.
Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 247; Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258
(1938); Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406 (1938); Charles E. Adams, 39 B.T.A. 387
(1939); William B. Gillies, P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec. 1139,161 (1939); Hawke v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 946; Herbert H. Springford, 41 B.T.A. 1001
(1940); Clarence L. Landen, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 1143,019 (1943); James M. Lamond,
P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 1146023 (1946); Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949); Malcolm S. Clark, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 1150,210 (1950); Albert Russel Erskine, 26 B.T.A.
147 (1932); Edward J. Epsen, 44 B.T.A. 322 (1941); Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner,
(6th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 64; Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 65 S.Ct. 591
(1945); Van Dusen v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 647.
2 Gardner-Denver Co. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 38, cert. den.
295 U.S. 763, 55 S.Ct. 922 (1935); Electric Storage Battery Co., 39 B.T.A. 121 (1939);
Commercial Investment Trust Corp., 28 B.T.A. 143 (1933); W. M. Ritter Lumber Co.,
30 B.T.A. 231 (1934).
8 Revenue Act of 1950, §218.
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hand, if the arrangement is avowedly compensatory and a corporation
in a 77 or 82 per cent tax bracket is more interested in securing a deduction than in protecting the employee from the realization of taxable
income upon exercise of the option, it will have to be certain that
the new statute will not apply. In either event, a full understanding
of the statutory provisions is necessary. All of the implications of the
statute, however, cannot be seen without an understanding of the
evolution and status of the law as it existed prior to the enactment
of the statute. Many able discussions4 have been written on the case
law of employee stock options and, accordingly, only a relatively brief
summary will be presented here.

The Case Law on Employee Stock Options

In T.D. 3435,5 published in 1923, the Treasury Department first
formally announced its position with respect to employee stock options
by stating unconditionally that when property is sold by an employer
to an employee for an amount less than its fair market value, the
difference between the amount paid for the property and the amount
of its fair market value should be included in the employee's gross
4 2 i\1ERTENS, FEDERAL l:NCOME TAXATION 58 (1942); WASHINGTON, CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION 90 (1942); Ahern, "Aiding Top Executives to Make Advantageous Deferred Compensation and Business Expense Anangements,'' N.Y.U. 7TH ANN.
INST. ON FEDERAL TAXATION 858 (1949); Alexander, "Employee Stock Options and the
1950 Revenue Act," 6 TAX L. R:sv. 165 (1951); Baker, "Stock Options for Executives,"
19 HAnv. Bus. R:sv. 106 (1940); Bastedo, "Taxing Employees on Stock 'P.urchases,'" 41
CoL. L. REv. 239 (1941); Blodgett, "Deferred Compensation of Executives," N.Y.U. 6TH
ANN. lNsT. ON FEDERAL TAXATION 764 (1948); Blodgett, "Recent Developments Concerning Deferred Compensation Plans," N.Y.U. 7TH ANN. INST. ON FEDERAL TAXATION
1093 (1949); Boland, "Employee Options Under The Federal Income Tax," 28 TAXES
415 (1950); Canary, "How An Employee May Seek to Raise Real Salary Without Increasing His Compensation," N.Y.U. 8TH ANN. l:Ns-r. ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1043 (1950);
Dann, "Employee Stock Options Under H.R. 6712," 37 GEO. L.J. 242 (1949); Dillavou,
"Employee Stock Options," 20 AccouNTING R:sv. 320 (1945); Durant, "Deferred Compensation and Related Anangernents," AMER. U. TAX INST. LECTURES 265 (1949); Freedman, "A Restatement of Tax Incentives in Compensating High-Salaried Executives," 4
RuTGERS L. R:sv. 617 (1950); Friedman and Silbert, "Stock Option and Stock Purchase
Plans," N.Y.U. BTli ANN. INsT. ON FEDERAL TAXATION 433 (1950); Hirsch, "Basis Problems in Employee Stock Option Transactions," 2 INTRAMURAL L. R:sv. 24 (1946); Lyon,
"Employee Stock Options Under The Revenue Act of 1950," 51 CoL. L. R:sv. I (1951);
Ross, "Tax Consequences of Employee's Stock Option Plans," 26 TAXEs 137 (1948); Sax,
"Stock Options," 23 TAXES 505 (1945); Seghers, "Stock Purchase Options Under the New
Treasury Rules," 81 J. of AccouNT. 452 (1946); Schneider, "Taxation-Employee Stock
Options Under The Revenue Act of 1950-A Return to the Bargain-Purchase Concept," 34
MARQ. L. REv. 211 (1951); Schwenk, "Disguised Compensation and Dividends as Taxable
Income," 60 HARv. L. R:sv. 44 (1946); Tyler, "Stock Options," 24 TAXEs 611 (1946);
note, 2 TAX L. REV. 85 (1946); note, I TAX L. R:sv. 225 (1946); comment, 56 YALE L.J.
706 (1947); note, 50 HAnv. L. R:sv. 500 (1937).
5 II-I Cum. Bul. 50 (1923).
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income. That provision was incorporated in article 31 of Treasury
Regulations 65 promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1924 and,
with immaterial changes in phraseology, it was carried forward into
the regulations promulgated under the Revenue Acts of 1928, 1932,
1934 and 1936.6 The United States Tax Court and the courts of
appeals refused, however, to go as far as the regulations and ultimately
evolved a rule that the difference between the option price and the
value of the stock acquired under the option would be regarded as
taxable income to the employee only if it appeared that the parties
intended that the difference be compensation to the employee. If it
appeared from the agreement and the circumstances that the option
was not intended as a means of compensating the employee, it was
held to result merely in the purchase of property at a bargain price
from which no income would be derived until sale of the stock.7
The Commissioner thereupon conceded the issue and in January
1939, in T.D. 4879,8 he amended the income tax regulations to provide that if property is sold or transferred by an employer to an
employee for an amount "substantially" less than its fair market value,
the employee would be required to report the difference as taxable
income "to the extent that such difference is in the nature of compensation for services rendered or to be rendered." 9 That appeared to
settle the rule of law, and the question of the taxability of the exercise of
stock options thereby became merely one of fact as to whether the option
was or was not intended as a means of compensating the employee. In
1943, however, there came before the Tax Court the case of John H.
Smith v. Conunissioner1° in which Smith's corporate employer, which
was entitled to receive stock of another corporation for services in the
mangement of that corporation under a reorganization plan, gave him
an option to acquire part of that stock for services which he performed
in negotiating the plan of reorganization. The fair market value of the
stock did not exceed the option price at the time the option was granted, but was greatly in excess of it at the time Smith exercised the option
and at the time the shares were delivered to him. Both the documentary
6 Art. 31, Regulations 69 (1926 Act); Art. 51, Regulations 74 (1928 Act) and 77
(1932 Act); Art 22(a)-l, Regulations 86 (1934 Act) and 94 (1936 Act).
7 See decisions cited in notes l and 2 supra.
s 1939-1 (Part 1) Cum. Bul. 159.
9 As so amended the provision appeared in Art. 22(a)-l, Regulations 101, promulgated
under the Revenue Act of 1938, and until again amended in T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum. Bul.
18, it so appeared in §29.22(a)-l of Regulations 103 and 111, promulgated under the
Internal Revenue Code.
10 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 1f43,101 (1943).
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evidence and Smith's own testimony clearly established the fact that
the option was given to him as compensation for his services. Although
it was the first case in which the court held that taxable· income resulted when the option price was equal to the fair market value of the
stock at the time the option was granted, the compensatory character
of the option was so clear that the court decided against the taxpayer
in a memorandum decision. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit,11 however, reversed the Tax Court on the ground that since
the option price was equal to the value of the stock at the time the
option was granfed, there was no bargain purchase and no basis for
holding that the subsequent differential was compensation for services
or income to the taxpayer.
Because of an asserted conflict between that decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Connolly's
Estate 11. Commissioner,1 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and, with Justice Roberts dissenting for the reasons
stated by the court of appeals, the majority of the Court held that
the option itself could not be regarded as the intended compensation
by reason of the fact that it had no fair market value at the time it
was granted and, consequently, the compensation which the parties
contemplated was not confined to the mere delivery of the option, but
included the compensation obtainable by the exercise of the option
given for that purpose.13 It found that the terms of the applicable
revenue act relating to the definition of gross income were broad
enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit
conferred on an employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode
by which it is effected. In the ·course of the decision, the Court stated
that when the option price is less than the market price of the property
for the purchase of which the option is given, the option itself rather
than the proceeds of its exercise might be found to be the "only intend. "
ed compensat:Ion.
11Smith v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 818.
12 (6th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 64. In that case the decedent's corporate employer,
pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors reciting that the compensation previously
paid him was disproportionate to the value of his services and that he should be given
adjusted compensation in the form of an option to purchase stock, granted him an option at
a price which was substantially below the market value of the stock on the New York Stock
Exchange, both at the time the option was granted and when he exercised it. The court
of appeals affirmed a decision of the Tax Court (45 B.T.A. 374) that taxable income was
realized upon exercise of the option. The fact that a difference existed between the option
price and the value of the stock at the time of grant would probably have led the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to decide this case in the same way.
13 Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 65 S.Ct. 594 (1945).

1952]

EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS

413

The Smith case was not generally regarded as an extension of the
rule applied by the lower courts, except possibly in so far as it ended
any question that income from the exercise of a stock option could not
under any circumstances be derived if the option price was equal to
the fair market value of the stock at the time the option was granted.14
Nevertheless, on April 12, 1946, the Commissioner again amended the
regulations1 5 to provide unqualifiedly. that any difference between
the value of property transferred by an employer to an employee and·
the price paid by the employee, whether or not substantial, is in the
nature of compensation and shall be included in the gross income of
the employee.
As a result, the assertion of a tax liability on a favorable purchase of
stock became inevitable even in circumstances where the option clearly
was not intended as compensation and the option price was the exact
equivalent of the value of the stock at the time the option was granted.
Thus, let us assume that a corporation believes that production will
be increased and labor relations substantially improved if it can persuade its employees to purchase stock and thereby acquire a proprietary
interest in the success of the business. It recognizes that those purposes
can be better accomplished if the employees actually have an investment in the stock rather than having it handed gratuitously to them,
but it also realizes that the employees are not going to subscribe to
the stock without some material inducement. It therefore grants an
option to acquire the stock at a fixed price in order that the employees
will find it advantageous to purchase if the value of the stock does, in
fact, increase. Under the decisions of the courts, an option granted
under such circumstances clearly would not give rise to taxable income,
but under the regulations taxable income would result if the value
of the stock did exceed the option price at the time of exercise. Obviously, the possibility that an employee would have to pay not only the
purchase price of the stock but also an additional tax liability would
substantially reduce the attractiveness of the option and the likelihood
that he would exercise it.
14 Accordingly the decisions in Rose v. T;rust Co. of Georgia, Durkee v. Welch, Bothwell v. Commissioner, Merhengood Corp. v. Helvering, Rossheim v. Commissioner, and
Hawke v. Commissioner, cited in note 1 supra, appear to be of doubtful authority at the
present time. See Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 388 at 393 (1947). In each of those
cases the option arrangement appeared to be of a compensatory character and the courts
relied principally on the fact that the option price and the value of the stock were substantially equal at the time the option was granted.
15 T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum. Bul. 18.
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Accordingly, to overcome the deterrent -effect of the regulations
on the use of an employee stock option as an incentive device, section
130A was devised.16 With this background, we may turn to a study of
its provisions.

Statutory Provisions Applicable to Stock Options
Restricted Stock Options. The keystone of the new section is a
"restricted stock option" as defined in subsection (d) (1). The elements of the statutory definition are as follows:
(1) Stock subject to the option. The option must provide for the
purchase of stock of either the employer corporation or its parent or
subsidiary. The term "parent corporation" is defined to mean any corporation other than the employer corporation in an unbroken chain
of corporations ending with the employer corporation, each of which
at the time of the granting of the option owns stock possessing more
than 50 per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock in one of the other corporations in such chain. The term
"subsidiary corporation" means a similar chain of corporations beginning with the employer corporation. The statute does not define
what is meant by stock. There is nothing to indicate that it could not
be preferred stock or any other class of nonvoting stock,17 but it is
questionable whether voting trust certificates would qualify.
(2) Date of grant. The option must be granted after February
26, 1945, which is the date the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Commissioner v. -Smith. The selection of that date is not explained
in the committee reports,1 8 but it is probably due to the fact that subject to certain conditions, the Commissioner announced that the
amended regulations would not be applied to options granted prior to
that date.19
(3) Purpose. The option must be granted for some reason connected with the individual's employment by a corporation. This pro16 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
17 Compare I.R.C., §14l(d).

2d sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bul. 483 at 526.

1s In the bill as reported by the Senate Committee on Finance the date selected was
December 31, 1946. The Senate changed the date but no reference to that fact was made
in the report of the Committee on Conference. H. Rep. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d sess.,
1950-2 Cum. Bul. 580.
19 I.T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. Bul. 15. The condition was that on or before July 1, 1946,
all taxpayers concerned file with the Commissioner written consents agreeing that the basis
of the stock would be the option price and that no deduction would be claimed, attributable
to any aspect of the option arrangement, under §23(a)(l) or any other subsection of the
Internal Revenue Code, and indemnifying the Commissioner against any action by any
taxpayer concerned inconsistent with the consents filed.
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vision is not, strictly speaking, a limiting condition but it indicates
that the application of secton 130A is not dependent in any way upon
the compensatory or noncompensatory character of the option.
( 4) Grantor of the option. The option must be granted by the
employer corporation or by its parent or subsidiary.
(5) Option Price. The option price must be not less than 85 per
cent of the fair market value, at the time the option is granted, of the
stock subject to the option. The determination of fair market value
will, of course, be one of the most troublesome factors in applying the
statute. As previously stated, the purpose of the enactment of section
BOA was to permit the use of stock options as an incentive for greater
productivity which would normally be reflected in an increase in the
value of the stock after the date of the option. Accordingly, a requirement that the option price be exactly equivalent to the fair market
value of the stock would have been consistent with that purpose. The
Senate Committee on Finance, however, recognized the difficulties
in ascertaining accurately the fair market value of the stock of many
corporations and, consequently, gave the 15 per cent leeway.20 In
the case, however, of stock not having a readily ascertainable market
value, the valuation can be a matter of a wide divergence of opinion.
Even an agreement as to value between the employer and employees
would probably not be accorded the weight ordinarily given to arm's
length transactions because their interests are so nearly akin. In the
case of stocks listed on an exchange, the fair market value on a particular day is usually taken as the average of the high and low prices
at which the stock sold on that day. The statute, however, does not
refer to the day on which the option is given but refers to the "time"
it is given. If an option is actually made known to the employees after
the close of the exchange and the market closed high, it is obvious that
an option price fixed at exactly 85 per cent of the average of the high
and low sales during the day could be too low. In the case of listed
stock, that difficulty can be avoided by using the high quotation of the
day for the purpose of measuring the option price. With respect to
unlisted stocks, it may not be possible to do more than make a bona fide
effort to fix a price at 100 per cent of the value of the stock, letting
the 15 per cent safety margin take care of differences of opinion on
the valuation question. That, of course, was all Congress intended.
(6) Transfer and Exercise. The option must by its terms affirmatively provide that the employee may not transfer it otherwise than by
20s.

Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bui. 483 at 526.
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will or by the laws of descent and distribution and, furthermore, that
during his lifetime it can be exercised only by him.
(7) Options to shareholders. The optionee may not at the time
the option is granted own stock possessing more than IO per cent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock of the employer
corporation or of its parent or subsidiary corporation. For this purpose,
the individual is considered as owning the stock owned directly or
indirectly by or for his brothers, sisters, spouse, ancestors and lineal
descendants, and likewise, his proportionate share of stock owned by
a corporation, partnership, estate or trust in which he has an interest.
It is clear that ownership of more than IO per cent of the stock of any
one of the corporations in the parent-subsidiary chain will defeat the
option whether or not the option is granted by the corporation in which
the employee already owns stock. This limitation was considered necessary to preclude the shareholders of a corporation from distributing
the corporation's earnings in the form of capital gains. 21
(8) Modifications, extensions and renewals. Under subsection
(e), for the purpose of determining whether the option is a restricted
stock option, as defined in subsection (d), any modification, extension,
or renewal of the option is considered as the granting of a new option
and the option price must be at least 85 per cent of the fair market
value of the stock on the date of the original granting of the option,
on the date of the making of such modification, extension, or renewal,
or on the date of the making of any intervening modification, extension, or renewal, whichever of those dates reflects the highest value.
Similarly, the employee could not on the date of the modification,
extension, or renewal, own more than IO per cent of the voting stock
of the corporation or of its parent or subsidiary even though he owned
less than that percentage at the time the original option was granted.
Tax Effect of a Restricted Stock Option. If the option qualifies
as a restricted stock option, subsection (a) provides for the tax effect
of its exercise upon the employee and the employer. It, in turn, imposes
substantial restrictions upon the exercise of the option and with respect
to the disposition of the stock acquired upon the exercise of the option,
but if those restrictions are observed it provides that no income shall
result at the time of the transfer of such share to the individual upon
his exercise of the option with respect to such share; that no deduction
under section 23(a) (relating to ordinary and necessary business expenses) shall be allowable at any time to the employer corporation of
such individual or its_ parent or subsidiary corporation with respect to
21

Id. at 527.
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the share so transferred; and that no amount other than the option
price shall be considered as received by either of such corporations for
the share so transferred.
It will be seen that that provision. does not expressly prohibit the
recognition of income upon the receipt of the option itself, which the
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Smith- said could under some circumstances be found to ·be the only intended compensation. The
committee report, however, makes it clear that no income is to be
recognized either upon the receipt of the option or upon its exercise.22
This section is also silent as to the treatment for tax purposes of the
gain derived by the employee upon the sale or exchange of the stock
acquired under the option,23 nor does it expressly provide what amount
shall be considered as the employee's basis for determining gain or loss
upon the sale or exchange of the stock. In subsection (b) such rules
are partially provided where the option price is less than 95 per cent
of the value of the stock on the date the option is granted. There
appears to be no question, however, that section 117 will apply to any
gain or loss realized on the sale or exchange of the stock and it is manifest that no one could successfully argue that his basis exceeded the
actual purchase price of the stock except as otherwise expressly provided in subsection (b).
With respect to the corporation, a deduction is prohibited under
section 23(a) relating to ordinary and necessary business expenses, but
if treasury stock is sold at below the corporation's cost and the corporation would otherwise be entitled to take such loss into account, nothing
in section BOA appears to defeat its right to do so. Similarly, nothing
in the section protects it from the recognition of gain, and it is possible
that that gain will be measured not by the option price but by the
actual fair market value of the stock. That question will depend upon
whether the value of the services received by the corporation in exchange for the stock was equal to the value of the stock on the date
of transfer. 24 It may also depend upon whether the option was or was
not intended to be compensatory although it is possible that the courts
could hold that stock issued pursuant to an option which was merely
an incentive device produced economic benefits to the corporation
equal to the fair market value of the stock it transferred. If gain is
22 Id. at 526. The Finance Committee said, "Under your committee's bill no tax will
be imposed at the time of exercise of a 'restricted stock option' or at the time the option :is
granted and the gain realized by the sale of the stock required through the exercise of the
option will be taxed as a long-term capital gain."
23 This omission is likewise supplied in the Committee Report. See note 22 supra.
24 International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 310.
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recognized in excess of the difference between the corporation's cost of
the stock and the option price, the corporation, nevertheless, would
appear to be precluded from claiming any offsetting deduction under
section 23(a). The provision that no amount other than the option
price shall be considered as received by the corporation appears to be
designed to prohibit the corporation from claiming any greater addition
to its paid-in capital for the purposes of the excess profits tax.
Limitations on Tax Exemption under Subsection (a). This brings
us to a consideration of the restrictions that are imposed upon the exercise of the option and disposition of the stock.
(I) Exercise of the option. With respect to exercise, the requirement that the option be exercised after 1949 presents no difficulty.
The second requirement is that at the time of the exercise of the option
the individual must be an employee of the corporation granting such
option, or of a parent or subsidiary corporation of such corporation or it
must be exercised by him within three months after the date he ceases
to be an employee of any of such corporations.
It is interesting to note that in this connection the language refers
to· "a" parent or subsidiary and makes it clear that employment by any
of the corporations within the chain, up or down, from the employer
corporation will satisfy the employment requirement. In subsection
(d)(l) relating to the stock which may be the subject of the option,
in subparagraph (d)(l)(C) relating to the IO per cent stock ownership rule, and again in subparagraph (a) (I) (2) relating to the corporate deductions, the statute speaks of the employer corporation or "its"
parent or subsidiary. It is unlikely that those provisions were intended
to be limited to the employer corporation and the corporations immediately above and below it, but the difference in the language should
not be overlooked if corporations more remote in the chain are brought
into the option plan.
The term "employee" is not defined and, consequently, will probably be interpreted in the light of the common law rule of employeremployee relationship.
It will be noted that if the option is not exercised by the optionee
while he is employed, it must be exercised "by him" after the termination of his employment. As we have seen, the definition of a restricted
stock option does not prohibit transferability of the option, if unexercised at the time of the employee's death, by his will or by the laws
of descent and distribution; and with respect to the exercise of the
option, it requires only that it be exercised by him during his lifetime
and does not require that the option expire at his death. Accordingly,
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it is clear that the option may be exercised after the employee's death,
but there is a substantial question whether the benefits of subsection
(a) can be obtained upon an exercise other than by the employee himself. Nothing in the committee reports clarifies this question. As will
be brought out in subsequent discussion, when the option price is
less than 95 per cent of the value of the stock at the time the option
is granted, the statute requires that upon the sale, exchange, gift, or
other transfer of legal title of the stock, or upon the death of the employee, there be treated as ordinary income and not as a capital gain
the difference between the option price and the fair market value of
the stock either at the time of such disposition or at the time the option
was granted, whichever is the lesser. If the benefits of subsection (a)
were to be extended to cover the exercise of the option after the date
of the employee's death, the provisions of subsection (b) would have
to be amplified to cover the subsequent disposition of the shares by the
person who exercised the option. On the other hand, if the option
did not fall within the 95 per cent rule and was exercised by the
employee prior to his death, no amount would ever be taxable as ordinary income and it would appear to be highly unfortunate to tax the
beneficiaries of his estate upon income which would have been tax-free
to the decedent. The apparent conllict between the definition of a restricted stock option and the limitation in subsection (a) that the option
be exercised by the employee would justify the Commissioner in interpreting subsection (a) to apply to the decedent's beneficiary, but absent
such an interpretation the question will probably have to be resolved
by the courts.
·
(2) Required retention of the stock. The benefits of subsection
(a) cannot be obtained if any disposition of the share is made within
two years after the date of the granting of the option or within six
months after the transfer of the share of stock to the employee. Subsection (d) ( 4) defines the term "disposition" to include a sale, exchange, gift, or any transfer of legal title except a transfer from a
decedent to his estate, a transfer by bequest or inheritance, an exchange
which is within the provisions of sections 112 (b) (2) or (3), or a
mere pledge or hypothecation.
It will be noted that the statute refers in terms of a share of stock,
and the legislative history makes it clear that the provisions of subsection (a) will apply to any shares with respect to which the requirements are met even though those benefits are denied with respect to
other shares acquired upon the exercise of the same option. 25 Thus, if
25 H.

Rep. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bul. 580 at 587.
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an employee acquires some shares while he is still employed, or within
three months after his employment is terminated, or if he holds some of
the stock for the full two years from the date of the granting of the
option and for six months after the transfer of the shares to him, he
will realize no income upon the exercise of his option with respect to
those shares even though other shares acquired under the same option
are purchased more than three months after he has ceased to be an
employee or are disposed of before the end of. the prescribed holding
period.
Thus, it will be seen that if all of the requirements of a restricted
stock option are met and all of the rules as to the exercise of the option
and retention of the stock are observed, no taxable income will result
to the employee as a result of the receipt of the stock. Moreover, if the
option price is at least 95 per cent of the fair market value of the stock
at the time the option is granted, any income derived from the sale or
exchange of the stock will be treated as a long-term capital gain. 26 A
special rule is provided under subsection (b), however, if the option
price is less than 95 per cent of the value of the stock on the date the
option is granted.
Special Rule Where Option Price Is Between 85 P~r Cent and 95
Per Cent of Value of Stock. Subsection (b) provides that upon the
death of the employee or in the event of a disposition of the stock by
him, "there shall be included as compensation (and not as gain upon
the sale or exchange of a capital asset) in his gross income" the amount
by which the option price is exceeded by the lesser of the fair market
value of the share at the time of such disposition, or death, or the fair
market value of the share at the time the option was granted. Again,
presumptively, any gain realized by sale or exchange in excess of the
amount so taxable as ordinary income would be taxed as a capital gain.
As stated above, the term "disposition" is defined in subsection (d)(4)
to include a sale, exchange, gift, or transfer of legal title ~xcept a transfer from a decedent to his estate or by bequest or inheritance, an
exchange for stock or securities in a tax-free reorganization, or a mere
pledge or hypothecation. If the requirements of subsection (a) are
met, the denial of a deduction to the corporation applies to any amounts
treated as ordinary income under subsection (b).27
26 Since subsection (a) requires the stock to be held at least six months, gain derived
upon the sale of stock held in conformity with that requirement will necessarily be a longterm gain under the present provisions of I.R.C., § 117(a)(4). H the holding requirement
under the latter section should be extended without a corresponding amendment of
§l30A(a), sale of the stock could result in a short-term gain.
- 2 7 H. Rep. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bul. 580 at 587.
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Insofar as this section purports to include in the employee's gross
income "as compensation," the difference between the option price and
the fair market value of the stock at the time of the employee's death
or any disposition of the stock without consideration, it appears to be of
doubtful validity in cases where the option was granted under circumstances which would have led the courts to hold that it was not compensatory and that no taxable income was derived from its exercise. If the
gain is realized by sale or exchange, the Congress could unquestionably
deny to the taxpayer the benefit of subsections (b) and ( c) of section 117
of the code which permit a taxpayer to take into account only 50 per
cent of the gain and to compute his tax at a rate not in excess of 50
per cent of the amount so taken into account. As applied to gain on a
sale or exchange, it is probable that the courts will construe the phrase
"as compensation" merely as surplusage and treat the provisions of
subsection (b) of section 130A as merely a limitation upon section 117.
The objection is more fundamental, however, insofar ::}S the statute
attempts to create taxable income by reason of the death of the optionee,
or of a gift or other transfer of legal title without consideration. As we
have seen, the courts have held that where a stock option is not intended
as compensation, the optionee derives no taxable income from the
transaction until he actually realizes the gain by sale or exchange. An
unrealized increment in value is not income28 and Congress, therefore,
has no power to tax it without apportionment. 29 Mindful of the fact
that no provision of the income tax law, except the attempt to tax stock
dividends,30 has yet succumbed to an attack on constitutional grounds,
no one can hazard a guess as to what the attitude of the courts will be
when this question comes before them. If, however, they give full
effect to subsection (b), they will be forced to overrule the decisions
which hold that no income is derived from the exercise of a noncompensatory stock option. Accordingly, the employee or his transferee, in
appropriate cases, should protect his right to a refund of any tax paid
2s Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 38 S.Ct. 537 (1918); General Utilities and Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 594 (1935); Treas. Reg. lll, §29.41-2;
MERTENS, FEDERAL !NcoME TAXAnoN 169 (1942).
29 In Alexander, "Employee Stock Options and The Revenue Act of 1950" 6 Txx L.
REv. 165 at 177, 178 (1951), the author takes the view that "there can be little doubt
that Congress could have supported the Treasury position by the passage of an appropriate
law adopting the theory of the amended regulation." If Congress could have wholeheartedly
adopted the Treasury position, clearly it could do so to the limited extent provided in
§130A(b). However, if a bargain purchase under some circumstances is not "income," it is
difficult to see ho\\'. Congress can change its character by so naming it. Section 22 of the
code was broad enough to reach it where income did in fact result from the exercise of a
stock option.
30 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920).
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at ordinary income rates under the 95 per cent rule until its validity
has been determined by the courts. Furthermore, when an option is
granted under circumstances and for the purposes which would have
made it noncompensatory under the case law, the agreement should
be so drawn and a careful record so made that the optionees can
establish their immunity from tax.
As an adjunct of subsection (b), subsection (c) provides that if
stock transferred to an individual upon his exercise of a restricted stock
option is exchanged by him for stock or securities in an exchange within
the provisions of section l 12(b)(2) or (3), or if new stock, as described
in section I 13(a)(l9), is acquired upon a distribution with respect to
such stock, the stock or securities acquired in the exchange and such
new stock shall be considered as having been transferred to him upon
his exercise of such option. It will be noted that this section by its terms
applies only to new shares acquired by the employee after he himself
has exercised the option. In most cases under a stock option plan which
will have any considerable duration, it will be desirable to provide that
the shares which have been allocated to an employee will also carry
with them, without any increase in the option price, any stock dividends
which may have been issued by the corporation between the date of
the granting of the option and the date of the employee's exercise of it.
There appears to be no reason to assume that such shares, however,
would not be treated as shares received upon the exercise of the option
under subsection (a). This situation is not so clear, however, in the
event the corporate employer merges into another corporation prior
to the exercise of the option. Under those circumstances, if the option
agreement is assumed by the surviving corporation, such assumption
might be considered as a modi:6.cation, extension, or renewal of the
option.

Options Not Qualifying Under Section 130A
This brings us to the status of those options which do not qualify
for exemption under section BOA. That classi:6.cation includes an
option granted on or before February 26, 1945, one granted at a price
below 85 per cent of the fair market value of the stock, or one which
by its terms does not restrict the transferability of the option nor limit
exercise solely to the employee during his lifetime. It also covers an
option granted to a person who possesses more than IO per cent of the
voting stock of the employer corporation or its parent or subsidiary
corporation, and it includes even a restricted stock option to the extent
that the employee e~ercises the option more than three months after
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he ceases to be an employee of any of the corporations in the parentsubsidiary chain, or fails to hold the stock for two years after the date
of the granting of the option, or for six months after the transfer of the
share to him. As we have heretofore seen, under the old decisions the
exercise of the option would result in taxable income to the employee
and an allowable deduction to the employer if the option was intended
to be compensation. On the other hand, if the option was not intended
to be compensatory, no taxable income results to the employee and
no deduction is allowable to the employer. The latter rule is expressly
contrary to the present regulations, which, however, seem to take unjustified liberties with the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Smith. Even the Senate Committee on Finance stated that
in its belief the regulations go beyond the decision of the Supreme
Court and it cited the resulting uncertainty as to whether the regulations are in accordance with the law as an additional reason for taking
legislative action. 31 No cases have arisen which have dealt either with
options granted after the decision in the Smith case or after the change
in the regulations. Cases involving options granted prior to those dates
have, however, come before the Tax Court after the decision in the
Smith case, and in some instances after the change in the regulations
and the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950, and the Court has not
hesitated to apply the same rule that prevailed prior to 1945.32
The Senate Committee on Finance was careful to prevent any
inference that the enactment of the new statutory exemption should
influence the law with respect to options not covered by its terms. It is
true that the committee referred to the new section as according "special
treatment" to certain employee stock options, but that, of course, is the
fact with respect to those options embraced by its terms which would
otherwise have been held to be compensatory. It said, however, that
options which do not qualify as restricted stock options "will continue
to be taxed as under existing law."33 Again, it said that the section
contains no rules applicable to transactions respecting stock options
which are not restricted stock options and, further, that if the employee
disposed of his stock within the required holding period, transactions
31 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bul. 483 at 526.
32 James M. Lamond, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 1/46,023 (1946); Nonnan

G. Nicolson,
13 T.C. 690 (1949); Malcolm S. Clark, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 1/50,210 (1950) (all holding that no income was realized); and Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 388 (1947)
affd. (9th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 647 (in which a tax was imposed under circumstances
which would have led the court to find a compensatory option prior to the Smith case).
33 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bul. 483 at 526.
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respecting ·the option and such stock revert to their status under existing
law. 34 Accordingly, with respect to those options which do not qualify
for exemption under the statutory section, the conflict between the
unqualified position the Commissioner has taken in his regulations and
the more limited rule which has been applied by the courts remains
to be resolved in further litigation.
The conclusion should not be drawn, however, that a stock option
plan is valueless unless it immunizes the employee against ordinary
tax liability. As stated at the outset of this article, in view of the present
high rate of taxation on corporations, it is possible that the employer
would be more interested in its deduction than in providing tax-free
benefits to the employee. If the option is granted and exercised in
strict conformity with all of the rules of section· 130A, the deduction
will not be available to the employer. Similarly, if the case law continues to be applied as it has been heretofore, a noncompensatory
arrangement will not afford a deduction to the employer. Consequently,
a compensatory option plan not meeting the requirements of section
BOA(d) may be desirable to the employer corporation. Under such
a plan, exercise of the option will clearly result in taxable income to the
employee. However, the present high tax rates have created increasing
interest in plans by which compensation can be deferred so that part of
the compensation which the corporation would otherwise be willing to
pay an employee currently can be received by him after his retirement,
when his income is in lower tax brackets and the portion of such additional compensation which he can actually keep after paying his taxes
will be greater than it would have been if he had added it to his other
compensation while actively employed. Except where the corporation
is willing to provide a pension or profit-sharing plan and trust which
qualifies under section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code,35 the purchase of annuity contracts or an agreement to pay retirem~nt benefits,
whether it be funded or unfunded, entails considerable hazards to the
employee to some extent under the doctrine of constructive receipt, and
to a greater extent under the equivalent-of-cash or economic benefit
doctrine. 36 In the case of retirement benefits provided for officer-shareId. at 552 and 553.
I.R.C., §165(a)(3), a qualifying plan must benefit (1) 70% of all employees,
or (2) 80% of all eligible employees if 70% of all employees are eligible, excluding those
employed not more than a prescribed period up to five years and part time and temporary
employees, or (3) employees qualifying under a classification which does not discriminate
in favor of officers, shareholders, or supervisory or highly compensated employees. The latter
group are usually the ones for whom deferred compensation plans are desirable.
36 For an excellent discussion of the dangers of various "non-section 165 arrangements,"
see Blodgett, "Deferred Compensation of Executives," N.Y.U. 6TH ANN. INsT. ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 764 (1948).
34

35 Under
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holders of closely held corporations using the accrual method of accounting, the deduction by the corporation is also jeopardized by section
24(c) of the code.37 A stock option, however, can provide retirement
income without the dangers of a pension agreement. Even though the
employee realizes income upon the exercise of the option, he can space
that income as he sees :6.t. There is no danger that the doctrine of
constructive receipt would apply because the receipt of the income by
the employee is conditioned upon his making out of his own funds a
substantial payment for the stock and the doctrine does not apply to such
conditional rights. 38 Of course, if the employee wishes to reduce the
income to cash, he must sell the stock. In the case of stock having a
ready market, that presents no difficulty. In the case of closely held
corporations, the other shareholders may be willing to buy the stock,
but if the corporation itself should be the only market, section ll5(g)
of the code39 will present an obstacle to the full use of the stock option
as a deferred compensation plan. Even if the stock is not readily salable,
the employee will be enabled to increase his investment portfolio at a
much lower rate of tax than he would have paid had he received the
compensation during his period of active employment, and if he is
willing to sell and the corporation can and will buy his entire holdings
87 So far as pertinent here, §24(c) provides that "no deduction shall be allowed under
§23(a)" for the accrual of liability for compensation to a person on the cash basis who
directly or indirectly owns more than 50% in value of the corporation's outstanding stock
unless payment is made within two and one-half months after the close of the corporation's
taxable year. If a pension agreement matures and is nonforfeitable, the entire obligation of
the corporation probably accrues, but if the employee directly or constructively owns more
than 50% of the stock, the deduction is lost under §24(c). Of course, the retirement plan
would be one deferring the receipt of compensation within the meaning of §23(p), and
hence if the deferred compensation payments were deductible under that subsection, they
would be deductible in the year in which paid. To be deductible under §23(p), however,
the amount must be deductible under §23(a) without regard to §23(p), and in view of the
fact that in the circumstances to which it applies, §24(c) provides that no deduction shall
be allowed under §23(a), it cannot be said with assurance that §23(p) would save the
deductions.
SB Estate of John J. Hessian, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 1/43,203 (1943). See Dillis C.
Knapp, 41 B.T.A. 23 (1940); Walter I. Bones, 4 T.C. 415 (1944). U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§29.42-2 provides: "To constitute receipt [when income is not actually reduced to possession]
the income must be credited or set apart to the taxpayer without any substantial limitation
or restriction as to the time or manner of payment or condition upon which payment is to be
made••••"
"An executory limitation is none the less a condition because performance rests with
the grantee." Schaefer v. Bowers, (2d Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 689 at 691.
89 Subsection (1) of §ll5(g) provides that if a corporation cancels or redeems its
stock "at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or
redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent
that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913,
shall be treated as a taxable dividend."
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in the corporation he could do so without risk that any portion of the
proceeds would be treated as a taxable dividend.40 Similarly, upon his
death, if the value of his stock comprises more than 50 per cent of the
value of his net estate, his stock ·holdings can be partially liquidated
without invoking section 115(g) to the extent that the sale price does
not exceed his estate and inheritance tax liabilities.41 Imperfect as such
an arrangement may be, it nevertheless presents under the present
uncertain state of the law with respect to deferred compensation, a
method which is subject to fewer risks than ariy other plan yet devised
except the section 165 arrangements.
40Treas. Reg. lll, §29.ll5-9.
41 I.R.C., §ll5(g)(2).

